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Abstract 
It is well known that the Internet has significantly reduced consumers’ search costs online. But 
relatively little is known about how search costs affect consumer demand structure in online markets.  
In this paper, we identify the impact of search costs on firm competition and market structure by 
exploring a unique theoretical insight that search costs create a kink in aggregate demand when firms 
change prices. The significance of the kink reflects the magnitude of online search costs and the 
kinked demand function provides information on how search costs affect competition in the online 
market. Using a dataset collected from Amazon and Barnes & Noble, we find that search costs vary 
significantly across online retailers. Consumers face low search costs for price information from 
Amazon.com. It leads to a higher price elasticity when the firm reduces prices than when it increases 
prices, increasing Amazon’s incentive to engage in price competition. On the other hand, consumers 
face relatively higher search costs for price information from Barnes & Noble. This leads to a lower 
price elasticity when Barnes & Noble reduces prices than when it increases prices, reducing Barnes & 
Noble’s incentive to engage in price competition. We also find that search costs decrease with the 
passage of time as the information about price changes dissipates among consumers, leading to 
increased price elasticity over time. Finally, we highlight that search costs are lower for popular books 
compared to rare and unpopular books. These findings have implications for the impact of the Internet 
on the Long Tail phenomenon.   
 
 
Keywords:  Electronic Markets, Search Costs, Kinked Demand Curve, Price Elasticity, Price 
Competition, Long Tail  
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1. Introduction  
 An important advantage that electronic markets posit over physical markets is a reduction in 
search costs for product-related information.  This is especially true for product price information.  
Unlike in a physical market where consumers need to travel to multiple stores for price comparison, 
competitors’ prices are just a few clicks away in an online market.  The emergence of online shopbots 
such as Froogle, Pricegrabber, Dealtime etc. have further reduced consumer search costs by presenting 
price information for the same product from multiple online vendors.     
 The reduction in price search cost has rekindled interests in examining the Law of One Price 
(Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000). Theoretical research has shown that search costs create imperfect 
information about firms’ prices among consumers, which leads to equilibrium price dispersion in 
otherwise homogeneous product markets (Stigler 1961, Reinganum 1979, Rob 1985, and Stahl 1989).  
This provides an intuitive rationale for price dispersion that has been observed in conventional retail 
markets where consumers must incur the incremental costs of searching for prices at firms’ brick-and-
mortar stores.  As the internet reduces search costs in the online markets, price dispersion is expected 
to decrease and the Law of One Price is likely to prevail. 
Empirical evidence however shows that there is significant price dispersion online. In fact, 
research has often found a high level of price dispersion across Internet retailers as well as between 
online and offline channels. For instance, Clay et al. (2002) find a price dispersion of 27 percent for a 
random selection of hardcover books and 73 percent for paperback bestsellers. Similarly, Brynjolfsson 
and Smith (2000) find that Internet retailer prices differ by an average of 33 percent for books and 25 
percent for CDs. Recent work includes Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2004) who find price dispersion 
between 3.5% and 22%, depending on the number of online retailers competing in the market. At the 
same time, a few studies have shown that the Internet has reduced search costs online. Brown and 
Goolsbee (2002) find that while the use of the Internet is initially associated with an increase in price 
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dispersion of term life insurance premiums, the dispersion decreases as use spreads. Likewise, Morton, 
et. al. (2001) finds dispersion of car dealer prices decreases with online sales.   
 This presents an interesting scenario. On the one hand, since the Internet reduces search costs 
and searching for a better price becomes easier for consumers, conventional wisdom suggests that 
pricing pressure will increase on firms, thereby significantly reducing price dispersion.  On the other 
hand, mixed empirical evidence on price dispersion shows that search costs are omnipresent in the 
online world. This calls for a more detailed examination at search costs online and their implications 
for online retailers. To empirically investigate this issue, our research uses a new approach building on 
prior theoretical insights that relate the nature of consumer demand structure to the presence of search 
costs. Moreover, we also empirically validate the related theoretical prediction of how price 
information diffuses in the market.    
 A number of empirical studies have tried to quantify search costs both in online and offline 
settings.  Sorensen (2000) finds that patterns in price dispersion across prescription drugs are 
consistent with the predictions of a search model, as repeatedly purchased prescriptions show lower 
dispersion and price-cost margins. He estimated that the cost of conducting an exhaustive search is 
about $15 per consumer by using a structure equation approach (Sorensen 2001). Brynjolfsson, Dick 
and Smith (2004) take a different approach to estimate search cost as they can directly observe 
consumer search activity in their shopbot data. They found that the cost of an exhaustive search is 
about $6.45 per consumer. Hong and Shum (2006) develop a methodology for recovering search cost 
estimates using only observed price data.  Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) quantified the cost of entering 
into an eBay auction to be $3.20, which includes search costs and other costs related to auction 
participation.  In a related stream of work, Hann and Terweisch (2003) discuss how search costs and 
other related frictional costs in electronic markets could be substantial.  They find the median value of 
frictional costs ranging from EUR 3.54 for a portable digital music player (MP3) to EUR 6.08 for a 
personal digital assistant (PDA). 
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 The empirical work on search costs has shown that online search costs, although smaller than 
search costs in physical markets, are still significant.  The presence of such search costs are well 
known to affect the shape and dynamics of consumer demand and have significant implications for 
both micro and macro economic equilibrium. However, despite its importance, little empirical 
evidence exists so far on how search costs actually affect the structure of consumer demand and 
market competition.  The objective of our study is therefore to consider how such search costs affect 
market competition, and in particular how they influence consumer demand structure faced by online 
retailers.  Moreover, prior search costs literatures usually measure search costs as a consumer 
characteristic, implicitly assuming that search costs are the same across online retailers. Our study 
takes a first step to consider how search costs varies across online retailers and how such variations 
influence consumer demand and market competition for online retailers. The presence of search costs 
also implies that that it takes time for information about price changes to dissipate among consumers 
in the market.  This indicates that search costs are higher in the short-term. An additional contribution 
of this study is that we do so with only aggregate level data by exploring a unique insight of Stiglitz 
(1989) that search costs create a kink in aggregate demand when firms change prices. The significance 
of the kink reflects the magnitude of online search costs and the kinked demand function provides 
information on how search costs affect competition in the online market. The use of aggregate retail 
purchase data enables us to overcome limitations of earlier studies which are based on shopbot users. 
As shopbot users typically incur lower search costs, it is difficult to interpret the implications from 
those studies for online markets in general.  
 Using a dataset on price and demand from Amazon and Barnes and Noble, this paper 
demonstrates that consumer demand function exhibits a kink, validating Stiglitz (1989).  The direction 
and magnitude of the kink varies significantly across online retailers.  Price elasticity is higher for 
price decrease than for price increases on Amazon, indicating that Amazon’s price decrease 
information is quickly picked up by consumers. This suggests low search costs for Amazon’s price 
information.  On the contrary, price elasticity is lower for price decrease than for price increases on 
                                                  6
Barnes and Noble, indicating that potential customers are not aware of BN’s price decrease 
information. This suggests high search costs for BN’s price information. The combination of the two 
results implies that, while search costs are ubiquitous in online markets, search costs vary significantly 
across online retailers.  In addition, we find that price elasticity increases during the 4 weeks after 
price decreases, indicating that price information gradually penetrates the market over time. We also 
show that search costs are higher for obscure and unpopular books compared to the popular books. 
The result indicates that less popular books continue to face disadvantages in online markets, 
suggesting certain limitations on the Long Tail. Further, we also estimate the change in market share 
due to the presence of search costs, which prevents information about price changes from percolating 
instantaneously in the market. In this way, our paper also contributes to recent research that 
demonstrates the price competition between online retailers (Chevalier and Goolsbee 2003). In sum, 
our paper aims to make the following contributions: 
1. We provide the first known empirical analysis of the nature of search cost on consumer demand 
curve in electronic markets. We show that as predicted by theory, consumer demand is indeed 
kinked, and this highlights that consumers face positive search costs even in online markets. 
Unlike prior work, our results use aggregate price and demand data from large online retailers, 
thus making the result more applicable to the general online markets.   
2. We show how search costs vary across online retailers.  We find that consumers face low search 
costs on Amazon, but high search costs on Barnes & Noble. Our finding suggests that consumer 
search costs are potentially related to differences in retailer characteristics because of which 
otherwise similar online retailers may impose very different search costs on consumers. The result 
sheds more light on difference across online retailers and offers new insights into the underlying 
factors that drive their competitive strategies. Further, we also consider the dynamics of how 
search costs change over time. We demonstrate that price elasticity after a price decrease increases 
over time across a period of 4 weeks, suggesting that search costs for price information in 
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electronic markets do reduce over time. The fact that search costs are dynamic over time has both 
theoretical and practical implications for online markets, and we discuss them in detail.  
3. Our empirical analysis corroborates anecdotal evidence that popular books have lower search cost 
compared to less popular and obscure books. The results less popular books continue to face 
disadvantages in online markets. This may put a limit on the extent of the Long Tail phenomenon.  
On the flip side, it also suggests that there are opportunities for online retailers to further reduce 
search costs for less popular books. As is being witnessed in the Long Tail phenomenon, 
consumer demand for less popular books has been substantial and a reduction in their search costs 
could further enhance the advantages of online retailers. 
4. Finally, we also analyze the effect of search costs on relative market shares of Amazon and Barnes 
and Noble. We show that compared to Barnes and Noble, Amazon has a stronger incentive to have 
lower prices for unpopular and rare books since the potential market share gains are larger for 
Amazon. In contrast, for popular books, Amazon has a mixed incentive. 
 The rest of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we present the theoretical framework based 
on which the empirical estimations are carried out. The data is described in Section 3. Thereafter, we 
provide the empirical methodology and test our main hypothesis in Section 4. The analysis of the 
impact of search costs on the demand structure for popular vs. unpopular books along with its impact 
on relative online market shares of Amazon and Barnes & Noble is presented in Section 5. Section 6 
offers concluding remarks with discussion of possible extensions. The tables are in the Appendix. 
2. Theory 
 A well-known feature of search costs in a competitive marketplace is that it creates a kinked 
demand function (Stiglitz 1989). He suggested that when the underlying consumer demand function is 
kinked, the demand elasticity for price decreases is different from the demand elasticity for price 
increases. The significance of the kinkiness is determined by the magnitude of the search cost faced by 
consumers.  When search cost is high, consumers are only aware of the price of the store they visit, but 
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are unaware of the prices for the same product in the retailers they do not visit. So when a retailer 
increases its price, its own immediate customers (who know about the increase) are induced to search 
for prices amongst rival retailers and the store loses customers accordingly. But when a retailer 
decreases its price, then unless it expends resources on advertising, its action induces no new 
customers to launch a search. Hence, while it will able to keep its existing customers, it does not gain a 
proportionate number of new customers. This leads to a lower price elasticity for price decreases.  
Under such circumstances, the gains to lowering prices may be markedly lower than the losses from 
raising prices. 
 On the other hand, when search cost is low, a reduction in product price by a retailer has the 
potential to attract customers from its competitors, but a price increase only affects the firm’s current 
customers. This leads to a higher price elasticity for price decreases.3 Thus, by studying the 
characteristics of the consumer demand function, we can infer the level of search costs in online 
markets. In order to empirically investigate the nature of the demand function, we allow the demand 
elasticity for price decreases to be different from price increases. 
 The presence of search costs is well documented in physical market. The literature on the 
economics of information identifies two types of search costs that influence information search – 
external and cognitive. External search costs include monetary costs of acquiring information, that is, 
the opportunity cost of time. On the other hand, cognitive search costs reflect the mental accounting 
efforts consumers must invest in to direct search enquiries, sort incoming information and integrate it 
with stored information to form decision evaluations. These costs are generally influenced by 
consumers’ bounded rationality in processing the plethora of incoming information. 
 Electronic markets reduce monetary costs of acquiring information. However, since 
information in online environments is highly visual and perceptual, it potentially increases cognitive 
costs that affect consumers’ search for information (Chiang 2006). Furthermore, information search 
                                                 
3 In such a situation a firm enjoys a discontinuous jump in demand when it succeeds in charging the lowest price 
because it instantly attracts the price-sensitive “shopper” segment of the market 
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online is characterized by human-computer interaction requiring consumers to have increased ability 
and knowledge in acquiring information (Hodkison et al., 2000). As a result, the Internet can impose a 
certain degree of cognitive cost on consumers that could potentially prevent consumers from searching 
for more information.4    
3. Data 
We estimate our models using a panel data set compiled from publicly available information 
about product prices and sales rankings, gathered using automated Java scripts. These scripts access 
and parse HTML and XML pages downloaded from Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble.com between 
September 2005 and April 2006. The panel includes daily data over 3210 books across all major book 
categories. These products include a mix of best sellers, new releases, random selected titles and less 
popular books selected from the different genres such as fiction, non-fiction, business, textbooks, 
computer books and so on. 
We collect data from both Amazon and Barnes & Noble for the same set of books to control 
for competition among online retailers. In the context of online book sales, Barnes & Noble and 
Amazon are the two largest book retailers online, and their pricing policies influence each other. To 
control for competition from remaining online book retailers and used book markets, we also collected 
secondary market data that including the number of used copies available for sale and the minimum 
price of the used books in Amazon’s marketplace. We note that Amazon allows small book retailers 
like Abebooks and Powells to sell books on its marketplace. Thus, our data takes into account some of 
the competitive influence from other retailers.   
Each observation from Amazon contains the date of data collection, the product’s list price, its 
Amazon retail price, its Amazon sales rank (which serves as a proxy for units of demand, as described 
                                                 
4 Chiang (2006) notes that “in order to search online, consumers must not only be able to locate the websites of 
interest and move between sites but also to acquire information within the sites. There are several ways to 
identify the location of websites: (1) via search engine, (2) via manual entry of a URL and (3) via the memory 
aid of a browser such as bookmarks. Given the vast amount of information available on the Internet, these search 
techniques will affect consumer information search.” 
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later), the date the product was released into the market, the average customer rating for the product, 
and the number of reviews based on which the average rating was computed. Each observation from 
Barnes & Noble contains similar items: the date of data collection, the product’s list price, its Barnes 
& Noble retail price, its Barnes & Noble sales rank (which also serves as a proxy for units of demand, 
as described later), , the average Barnes & Noble customer rating for the product, and the number of 
reviews based on which the average rating was computed. The summary statistics of our data are in 
Table 1. It shows a significant amount of variation in the sample we use, covering a wide range of 
books with different online prices, sales ranks, secondary market information and release dates.  
An interesting aspect of the dataset is the frequency of price changes made by both retailers 
because this is likely to affect search costs. In our data we find that on an average, Amazon changes a 
book’s price every 151 days and Barnes & Noble change prices every 49 days. Such price rigidity has 
a similar flavor to the findings of the Bergen, Kauffman and Lee (2005) although in terms of the actual 
magnitude, they find that price changes on an average every 222 days for Amazon.com and every 56 
days for Barnes & Noble.com.  
4. Empirical Methodology 
 In order to test the theoretical predictions, we need to estimate demand. Neither Amazon nor 
Barnes and Noble report their periodic demand levels. Instead, they reports a sales rank for each 
product sold on its site, which ranks the demand for a product relative to other products in its category. 
Thus, the lower the cardinal value of the sales rank, the higher the demand for that particular item. 
Until recently it was difficult to calculate the price elasticity for products sold on the Internet because, 
while the price of individual items could be readily observed, the quantity sold was generally 
unobservable. However, an emerging stream of work has addressed this problem by providing a way 
to map the observable Amazon.com sales rank to the corresponding number of books sold. In both 
cases, the authors find a stable relationship between the ordinal sales rank of a book and the cardinal 
number of sales, using the following Pareto relationship:  
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                                                      θδ RankQuantity ⋅=  (1) 
 Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) estimate the parameters of this equation for books by 
associating demand data with sales rank on the Wall Street Journal best-seller list, and by 
independently conducting a purchasing experiment on one book whose actual weekly demand was 
known to them.  Observing the extent to which Amazon sales rank reacted to their purchases, they 
estimate θ =-0.855. Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith (2003) provide an alternative estimate of the 
parameters of equation for books.  Using data from a book publisher that maps observed sales rank to 
the number of copies the publisher sold to Amazon, they estimate θ = −0.8715 and log[δ] = 10.5266. In 
their study of the impact of used book markets on new book sales, Ghose, Smith and Telang (2006), 
use θ = −0.871. For our study, we continue to use the same parameter for imputing demand for books. 
 We use a well-known log-log specification for our demand estimation.  The log-log 
specification has been widely used for estimating demand function and it has the benefits of offering a 
direct estimation of demand elasticity with the coefficient on the price variable (e.g. Brynjolfsson, Hu 
and Smith 2003; Ghose, Smith and Telang 2006). Using the relationship in (1), we can then estimate a 
demand model for a monopolistic online retailer in the following form: 
( ) ( ) itititiAiit XTPRank it εγβα +Ω′+++= loglog)log( 1  (2) 
where, i and t index  product and time. The dependant variable is the log of sales rank of product i at 
time t. The independent variables are the retailer price at time t (Pit) , the number of days since the 
product was released (Tit) and a vector of other control variables (X).  X include the log of the lowest 
used product price for a given product, the consumer rating for the product, the log of the number of 
reviews, and the log of the number of used products offered for sale. The multiplicative product of 
coefficient on retailer price β1 and the Pareto parameter θ  represents its price elasticity.  
                                                 
5 Parameter β2 in their model. 
6 Parameter β1 in their model. 
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 Stiglitz (1989) suggested that search costs lead to a kinked demand function. When search 
costs are high, price decrease information disseminates slowly among potential customers, but price 
increases are immediately observed by current customers. As a result, a firm in a high search costs 
environment faces lower price elasticity for price decreases than for price increases. This often 
happens for relatively smaller and lesser known firms whose price information is not well followed by 
the market.  On the other hand, when search costs are low, price decrease information disseminates 
quickly and attracts not only a firm’s own regular customers but its competitors’ customer as well.  
This results in higher price elasticity for price decreases than for price increases. This phenomenon is 
often observed for market leaders whose price information is well followed by customers and 
competitors.    
 Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the two kinked demand functions on a log-log scale plot. In these 
plots, the slope of the demand function represents demand elasticity. The changes in demand elasticity 
indicated by prior theory are reflected in the change of slope. Figure 1a shows the high search costs 
scenario as the demand curve in the figure is steeper for price increases than for price decreases.  
Figure 1b shows the low search costs scenario.  The demand curve is steeper for price decreases, as 
price decreases attract customers from a firm’s competitors while price increases affects only a firm’s 
own customers.  
                                                  13
                                            
 Figure 1a: A Kink in Demand Structure in a High Search Cost Scenario 
                                        
 Figure 1b: A Kink in Demand Structure in a Low Search Cost Scenario 
We empirically investigate this theory by allowing demand elasticity for price decreases to 
vary from that for price increases. To do so, we construct a dummy variable PriceDecrease which 
takes the value of 1 if the most recent action on product i is a price decrease. We note that the 
kinkedness happens at the price change point, which indicates that the slope for price decrease from 
the price change point is different from the slope for price increases from the price change point. Let 
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β2 
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the price before the most recent price change be itP . We can then modify equation (2) to the 
following form to capture the kinkedness in the demand function:   
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )0 1 2 3itit it j it it it
it it
log( Rank ) log P log P log P Pr iceDecrease log T
X
= β +β +β − × +β
′+Ω + ε     (3) 
             Here β1 represents demand elasticity for price increases.  β2   denotes the difference between 
demand elasticity for price decreases and that for price increases. Figures 1a and 1b provide a graphic 
representation of the two coefficients. A negative value of β2  implies high search cost wherein demand 
elasticity for price decreases is smaller than that for price increases. If  β2 is positive, it indicates a low 
search cost where demand elasticity for price decreases is larger than that for price increases.   
 The presence of search costs also suggests that it takes time for information on price decreases 
to spread in the market. To quantify this information diffusion process, we consider how demand 
elasticity evolves after a price change. We allow demand elasticity to vary from week to week for up 
to 4 weeks after the initial price decrease.8 This requires the creation of four weekly dummy variables, 
denoted by Weekijt to represent the number of weeks after the most recent price decrease. We use the 
four dummies to extend Equation (3) to capture the changes in price elasticity over time as follows:       
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ititit
j
ijtitititjitit
XT
WeekeiceDecreasPPPRank
εβ
βββ
+Ω′+
+××−++= ∑
=
log
Prlogloglog)log(
3
4,3,2,1
210
 (4) 
Equation (4) presents a kinked demand function for a monopolistic firm whose consumers 
face positive search costs.  In reality, most online retailers operate in a competitive environment. For 
example, in the book industry, the two largest online retailers are Amazon.com and Barnes & 
Noble.com. To consider the competitive implications, we extend Equation (4) into two demand 
                                                 
8 The number of weeks is not very critical towards understanding the result. We are interested in finding out 
whether search costs decrease with time, and this trend is qualitatively similar across different time periods.  We 
choose 4 weeks because our data reveals that Barnes and Noble responds to a price change on Amazon on an 
average after 30 days.  
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equations, one for each retailer. We incorporate both Amazon and Barnes & Noble’s prices into the 
equations to capture the own-price elasticity and the cross-price elasticity. The competition from 
remaining online retailers is captured by itX , which include book prices from Amazon Marketplace 
with listings from small online retailers.9 Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) show that taking the 
difference between the demand equations for the two firms enables estimation of relative price 
elasticity. This leads to the following estimation model:  
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ititit
j
BBBBjB
j
AAAAjA
BA
XTWeekeiceDecreasPPP
WeekeiceDecreasPPP
RankRank
itjitititit
ijtitititit
itit
εχχχ
χχχ
+Ω′++××−+
+××−++
=−
∑
∑
=
=
logPrlogloglog
Prlogloglog
)log()log(
4
4
1
43
4
1
210
 
 We also realize that product demand is largely determined by its characteristics unobserved by 
researchers. We therefore leverage our panel data structure to include fixed effect for each book. In 
addition, we also note that each book has its own demand dynamics. Some books last for months on 
the best sellers list, while demand for other book saturates rather quickly. To accommodate differences 
in demand dynamics across books, we allow the coefficient on log(Tit) to vary from product to 
product. The final empirical model therefore takes the following form: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) itititi
j
BBBBjB
j
AAAAjAi
BA
XTWeekeiceDecreasPPP
WeekeiceDecreasPPP
RankRank
itjitititit
ijtitititit
itit
εϕχχ
χχφ
+Ω′++××−+
+××−++
=−
∑
∑
=
=
logPrlogloglog
Prlogloglog
)log()log(
4
1
43
4
1
21
 (5) 
 To test the above model, we need to impute product demand from their sales ranks listed on 
Amazon. The Pareto curve indicates the log of demand is a linear function of the log of Amazon sales 
rank.  We can therefore use log(Rankit) in place of log(Demandit) in our log-log model and convert the 
                                                 
9 A browsing of Amazon Marketplace shows book offers from the following online retailers: A1books.com, 
Powells.com, eCampus.com and SuperBookDeals.com consisting of both new and used book offers. 
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coefficients on prices to demand elasticities by multiplying with the appropriate value of the Pareto 
parameter, θ. 10  
5. Analysis 
In this section we present the results of our empirical estimations. Specifically, we focus on 
the impact of search costs on overall demand structure, on the differences of search costs across 
retailers, on popular versus obscure books and on market competition between Amazon and Barnes & 
Noble.  
5.1 Search Costs and Demand Structure 
 The estimates are presented in Table 2. Column 1 presents the result of a base case analysis 
with consideration of competition between Amazon and Barnes & Noble but without considering the 
presence of search costs. The parameters of interest have the expected signs. The coefficient on 
Amazon price is positive, suggesting that price increase leads to increase in Amazon sale rank relative 
to Barnes & Noble sale rank, i.e. decrease in Amazon relative sales. On the other hand, the coefficient 
on Barnes & Noble price is negative, indicating that a Barnes & Noble price increase leads to decrease 
in Amazon sales rank relative to Barnes & Noble sales rank, i.e. an increase in Amazon’s relative 
sales. We also find that the coefficient on number of used books is positive, i.e. an increase in supply 
of used books on Amazon Marketplace reduces Amazon’s new book sales. On the other hand, 
minimum used product prices have a negative relationship with sales rank suggesting that an increase 
in used product prices boosts sales of new books on Amazon. Amazon customer rating and number of 
                                                 
10 Note that because of the structure of this industry, quantity and price are not jointly determined, and thus we 
do not face the endogeneity concerns that would normally arise in demand regressions. With regard to a 
retailer’s own price, because books are produced in large quantities prior to going to market, the quantity of new 
books Amazon can sell is predetermined (and virtually infinite) at the time Amazon sets their price.10 This 
follows the standard approach taken in the literature for demand estimation of Internet product sales (see for 
example, Chevalier and Goolsbee 2003, Ghose, Smith and Telang 2006). Moreover, Amazon has publicly 
claimed that it engages in price experimentations such that the sales ranks movements do not determine changes 
in price. This is also evident from the fact while we observe multiple changes in the sales rank of a given book 
on a given date, prices only change once every few days. This further reduces any potential endogeneity 
concerns.   
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reviews are also negatively related to sales rank, since an increase in customer ranking or in number of 
customer reviews potentially leads to higher sales on Amazon.  
  The regression results can be used to calculate the relative price elasticities of the two online 
retailers. As we discussed before, the relative price elasticities equals to the products of the 
coefficients from Table (2) and the Pareto parameter θ. Thus, using relevant values of θ,  we see that 
Amazon’s relative price elasticity for books is between -1.49 and  -1.89 and Barnes & Noble’s relative  
price elasticity for books is between -1.53 and -1.60. The range of price elasticities for the two firms is 
in tune with what one would expect. We find that the relative price elasticities for Amazon are both 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that, when prices rise at an online bookstore, relative 
sales ranks at that bookstore become larger, that is, relative sales go down.  
 Interestingly, we also find that the relative price elasticity for Amazon is very close to the 
relative price elasticity for Barnes & Noble. This however does not necessarily imply the demand 
dynamics at Amazon are similar to Barnes & Noble. As noted by Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003), the 
two retailers may have significant differences in their competitive position even if their relative price 
elasticities appear to be similar. We also note that the relative price elasticity of Amazon in this sample 
is between -1.79 and -1.86. This is slightly higher than that obtained in the prior research. Given that 
our sample has a high proportion of more new releases than the first sample, this is what one would 
expect. New releases have wider availability on the Internet, thereby leading to reduced market power 
for Amazon and thus higher relative price elasticities.  
  Columns 2 and 3 consider the presence of a kink in the demand function. After allowing price 
elasticity to be different for price increases compared to price decreases, we find that demand 
functions are indeed kinked for both Amazon and Barnes & Noble. We observe that Amazon’s relative 
price elasticity increases after a price decrease. The increase is gradual over time. Column 3 shows 
that the increases in price elasticity for the first two weeks are not statistically significant. However, 
starting in Week 3, the increase becomes statistically significant. Based on the Pareto parameter of -
0.871, the relative price elasticity for Amazon increases from -1.86 to -2.15 in Week 3 and -2.21 in 
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Week 4.11  This result corresponds to the low search cost scenario in Stieglitz’s (1989) theoretical 
model where a reduction in price produces higher price elasticity as a lower price enables the firm to 
attract consumers from its competitors. Our results also show that search costs reduce further over 
time as information disperses among online consumers. 
Contrary to the result on Amazon, we find that Barnes & Noble’s relative price elasticity 
decreases after price decrease. Column 3 shows that the decrease in price elasticity is stable over time 
and statistically significant. Based on the Pareto parameter of -0.871, the relative price elasticity for 
Barnes & Noble decreases from -1.59 to -0.82 in Week 1 and remains at the same level through the 
four-week period. This result corresponds to the high search cost scenario in Stiglitz’s model where, 
due to search costs, a large number of potential customers are not aware of price decreases. As a result, 
price decreases do not lead a significant increase in sales.   Our result also reveals that information on 
Barnes & Noble price decreases are not disseminated to potential customers even with the passing of 
time.  
The results of this study suggest that search costs vary significantly across online retailers. 
Some online retailers enjoy low search costs where its price information is quickly disseminated to 
potential customers. Conversely, other online retailers face much higher search costs, and few 
potential customers are aware of their price information.   
To avoid the impact of new book promotion and other site-based marketing activities that 
potentially affect book demand, we also ran similar regressions limiting our observations to those 
during the first 90, 180 and more than 180 days of book release. The 180 days cut-off threshold is 
established based on anecdotal evidence of a survey of marketing activities on Amazon.com which 
reveals most featured books are taken down within 6 to 7 months after release and that publicity is the 
                                                 
11 The relative price elasticity is equal to the Pareto parameter (-0.871) times the sum of the coefficient on 
Amazon price (2.14) and the coefficient on Week 3 after price decrease on Amazon (0.33).  Other relative price 
elasticities are similarly calculated. 
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most vital within the first six months from its publication date.12 The qualitative nature of our results 
was robust to these changes. 
5.2 Search Costs and Product Popularity  
Since the inception of online retailing in the mid-to-late 1990s, product assortments on the 
web have increasingly become broader and deeper. Internet retailers have nearly unlimited “virtual 
inventory” through centralized warehouses and drop shipping agreements with distributors 
(Mendelson and Meza 2002). This enables them to offer convenient access to a larger selection of 
products than brick-and-mortar retailers. For example, small stores stock approximately 20,000 unique 
titles, and large independent booksellers stock approximately 40,000 unique titles (Brynjolfsson, Hu 
and Smith 2003). Large differences in product variety are also seen in music, movies, and consumer 
electronics products. Even Wal-Mart Supercenters, which can be up to 230,000 square feet in size, 
only carry one-sixth of the number of SKUs that are carried by Walmart.com (Owen 2002). As an 
example of how the Internet is increasing orders for many titles not previously stocked in brick-and 
mortar stores, the MIT Press reported 12 percent annual increases in sales of backlist books (Postrel 
2004). 30-40 % of Amazon book sales are represented by titles that wouldn’t normally be found in 
brick-and-mortar stores (Brynjolffson, Hu and Smith 2003). 
 Prior work has argued that the Internet reduces search costs for rare and relatively unpopular 
books because online consumers are easily able to locate, evaluate, order, and receive millions of 
books that are not available on the shelves of local bookstores (Brynjolffson, Hu and Smith 2003). 
However, it is not clear to what extent that the internet has leveled the playing ground for the two 
kinds of books.  Popular books are still more likely to be advertised and prominently featured by 
bookstores. This is evident in both online and offline stores.  For example, Amazon always features 
the most popular books on its bookstore homepage. It also has pages dedicated to NY Times best 
                                                 
12 Florez, Jessica. 2005. Seven Vital Book Promotion Tips. (www. spotlightpublicity.com) 
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sellers and other best selling book lists.  These actions reduce search costs for price information of 
popular books more than that for the less popular books.  
Moreover price changes on popular books by one retailer are more likely to be matched by its 
competitor, leading to a faster dissemination of price change information and lower search costs on 
consumers. As an example, while it takes Amazon on average 74 days to response to Barnes & Noble 
price changes, if we separate books by their popularity, our data show that it takes Amazon an average 
of 55 days to respond to changes in prices for the top 20,000 books, 58 days to respond to changes in 
prices for the top 40,000 books and 65 days to respond to changes in prices for the top 100,000 books. 
On the other hand for unpopular books Amazon takes much longer to respond to changes in price by 
Barnes & Noble. For example, for books with sales rank higher than 100,000 Amazon responds to a 
price change after 90 days.13  
 In order to understand how search costs vary between popular books versus less popular 
books, we conduct a similar analysis as before but on a selected sample. Specifically, we split the 
sample by sales rank into two sub-samples. In keeping with the findings of prior work, we use 20,000 
and 40,000 as the median sales rank cut-off for denoting books that are relatively popular and are more 
likely to be stocked by offline retailers such as discount stores and specialty bookstores. Our results 
are consistent across different specifications and are reported in Tables 3 and 4. As a robustness check, 
we also used a median sales rank of 20,000 or 40000 as cut-off at Barnes and Noble. The results were 
qualitatively similar. Results using a median sales rank of 100,000 across both Amazon and Barnes 
and Noble are also very similar. These robustness checks are omitted for brevity. 
Our results reveal that the search costs for unpopular books are much higher than popular 
books. For unpopular books with median Amazon sales rank of more than 40,000 (Table 3, Column 
2), Amazon’s relative price elasticity decreases slightly after a price decrease. However, for popular 
books with a median Amazon sales rank of less than 40,000 (Table 4, Column 2), relative price 
                                                 
13 Interestingly BN’s response to price changes on Amazon seems independent of a book’s popularity. For the 
same cut-off ranges of top 20,000, top 40000, top 100000 and books with sales ranks greater than 100,000 the 
BN response time to a price change by Amazon consistently varies in a narrow range between 30 and 35 days. 
                                                  21
elasticity increases dramatically after a price decrease. This suggests information about price decreases 
in popular books is quickly disseminated among potential customers, but similar information for 
unpopular books does not spread as fast. We observe the same phenomenon for Barnes & Noble.  We 
find that Barnes & Noble’s relative price elasticity decreases significantly after a price decrease for 
unpopular books, but only decreases slightly for popular books. The results indicate a high level of 
search costs for unpopular books on Barnes & Noble.com, but only moderate level of search costs for 
popular books.  The difference in search costs between popular books and less popular books suggests 
that the Internet has not entirely removed the inherent disadvantages faced by less popular books.  
This imposes a limit on the extent of Long Tail phenomenon observed in the online book markets.  
This result also suggests that we may see more Long Tail phenomenon if the retailers are able to 
further reduce the search costs for less popular books to bring them in line with their popular books. 
5.3 Search Cost and Market Competition 
The presence of search cost has a direct impact on competition between Amazon and Barnes 
& Noble by influencing their incentives to change prices.  To illustrate the implication of search costs 
on market competition, we need to consider how price changes affect the market shares of the two 
retailers in the online world.  However, one weakness of sales rank data is that it provides only 
information with regard to sales within sites but not across sites.  To alleviate the problem, we 
calculate the relative market shares of Amazon and Barnes & Noble using actual sales data from their 
respective 2005 annual reports. Amazon’s annual report shows that its total sales of media products 
are $3 billion, while Barnes & Noble notes that its online division has total sales of $0.44 billion.14 
This suggests the relative online market share between Amazon and Barnes & Noble is about 6.82:1. 
We use this ratio as a reference case for our illustration of the impact of price changes on market 
competition.  
                                                 
14 Ideally, we would like to obtain relative market shares of Amazon and Barnes & Noble in the online book 
retailing market.  However, after extensive research, we are unable to obtain such information.  We therefore use 
the market share of media products (including books, CDs, and DVDs) as a proxy.   
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Using a Pareto parameter of -0.871 and results from Column 3 in Table 2, we find that a 1% 
increase in Amazon price leads to a 1.86% decrease in Amazon’s relative sales, thereby reducing its 
relative market share from 6.82:1 to 6.69:1. Similarly, a 1% price increase in Barnes & Noble price 
leads to a 1.59% decrease in Barnes & Noble relative sales, thereby increasing Amazon’s relative 
market share from 6.82:1 to 6.93:1. The result indicates that despite the significant difference in online 
market shares, the two online book retailers have about the same magnitude of impact on the market 
shares for price increases. The impacts of price decreases, however, are significantly different.  The 
same table indicates that a 1% price decrease in Amazon price leads to a 2.13% increases in Amazon 
relative market share in the 4th week after the price reduction. But a 1% decrease in Barnes & Noble 
price leads to only 0.80% increase in Barnes & Noble’s relative market share in the same week.  
Therefore, the impact of price decreases on Amazon’s market share is about 2.5 times the impact of 
price decreases on Barnes & Noble market share. The results indicate that Amazon could benefit 
substantially more from price decreases than Barnes & Noble due to the relatively lower search cost of 
price information incurred by consumers. As a result, Amazon has more incentives to reduce prices 
than Barnes & Noble does and in equilibrium, Amazon is likely to charge lower prices than Barnes & 
Noble. This intuition is validated in Table 1a which shows that the average Amazon price is $19.41, 
much lower than the average Barnes & Noble price of $23.35.   
 A closer look at the competition between Amazon and Barnes & Noble shows the impact 
of search costs on market share also varies from popular books to unpopular books. The results from 
Column 1 in Table 3 show that price increases in Amazon have a larger impact on relative market 
share for unpopular books than price increases in Barnes & Noble. A 1% increase in Amazon price 
leads to a 2.30% decrease in Amazon’s sales, thus reducing its relative market share from 6.82:1 to 
6.66:1. But a 1% increase in Barnes & Noble price leads to only a 1.14% decrease in Barnes & Noble 
sales, thereby increasing Amazon’s relative market share to 6.90%. The asymmetry between the two 
online book retailers indicates that Amazon has a lower incentive to increase prices on unpopular 
books compared to Barnes & Noble. The results from Table 3 also show that the magnitude of impact 
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of Amazon price decreases on unpopular books are about the same as that of its price increases.  A 1% 
decrease in Amazon price leads to a 2.15% increase in Amazon sales, increasing its relative market 
share from 6.82:1 to 6.96:1. On the other hand, the impact of Barnes & Noble price decreases on its 
market share is very different from that of its price increases. A 1% decrease in Barnes & Noble prices 
leads to a mere 0.16% increase in Barnes & Noble relative sales, barely increasing its relative market 
share.  This indicates that price decreases have little value for Barnes & Noble, but a much higher 
value for Amazon.   
 In sum, the combination of the impact of price increases and price decreases across the 
two online book retailers indicates that Amazon has a strong incentive to reduce prices on unpopular 
books, but Barnes & Noble has little incentive to do so.  Consequently, Amazon is more likely to have 
lower prices for unpopular books. This suggests that Amazon is in a better position to encourage sales 
of obscure and rare books and take advantage of the emerging Long Tail.  On the other hand, it also 
reveals that Long Tail results based on Amazon sales data may not be representative of the online 
book retailing industry in general, since Amazon appears to enjoy a significantly lower search costs 
for its less popular books than most of its competitors.   
       This result is well corroborated by the descriptive statistics in Table 1b which shows that 
the average price for unpopular books is significantly lower at Amazon than that at Barnes and Noble. 
The price difference between the two retailers for such books ranges between $3.96 and $ 4.73 which 
is approximately 25% of the average book price and is thus quite significant. These results are robust 
to different specifications used for defining unpopular book as shown in Table 1b.   
             The competitive scenario for popular books is slightly different. Column 1 in Table 4 shows 
that price increases on popular books have a larger impact for Barnes & Noble than for Amazon. A 1% 
increase in Barnes & Noble price on popular books reduces Barnes & Noble’s relative market share by 
2.23%. But a 1% increase in Amazon price on popular books only reduce Amazon’s relative market 
share by 0.77%. This indicates that, unlike unpopular books, Amazon has more incentive to raise 
prices on popular books than Barnes & Noble. For price decreases, the results indicate that a 1% 
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decrease in Amazon price on popular books will increase its relative market share by 2.72%, while a 
1% decrease in Barnes & Noble price on popular books will increase Barnes & Noble’s relative 
market share by 1.97%. As a result, Amazon has a larger incentive to reduce prices than Barnes & 
Noble for popular books.  
 The combination of the impact of price increases versus price decreases shows mixed 
implication for the competition between Amazon and Barnes & Noble. Not only does Amazon have 
stronger incentives to increase price than Barnes & Noble but it also has stronger incentives to reduce 
price than its main rival. The results indicate that price differences between Amazon and Barnes & 
Noble for popular books are likely to be mixed. 
As before, this intuition is well corroborated by the descriptive statistics in Table 1b which 
shows that the average price for popular books at Amazon could be either higher or lower that at 
Barnes and Noble. In cases where the BN prices are higher than those at Amazon, the price difference 
between the two retailers for such books ranges between $0.14 and $ 1.45 which is considerably lower 
than the range for obscure books. These results are robust to different specifications used for defining 
popular books as shown in Table 1b.  
 
6. Discussion and Limitations  
 A fundamental premise of economic theory is that the amount of information search will 
increase when search costs are reduced. Empirical evidence on consumer behavior with online 
shopping environments is quite in contrast to theoretical predictions. For example, by examining the 
shopping patterns of online users over time, Johnson et al. (2004) found that the amount of online 
search is actually quite limited. On average, households visit only 1.2 book sites, 1.3 CD sites and 1.8 
travel sites during a month in each product category. Another study by Jansen et al. (2000) revealed a 
similar pattern from the analysis of Web queries by Excite users. Most users had only a few queries 
per search, and 76% of users did not go beyond their first and only query. 
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 This suggests that consumers face search costs even in online markets.  But little is known 
how the search costs affect consumer demand and online retailers’ competitive strategies. Our paper 
aims to empirically test this phenomenon by analyzing the nature of the underlying demand function 
in electronic markets. Using a dataset from Amazon and Barnes and Noble, we show that consumer 
search costs vary significantly across online retailers. Consumer price elasticity on Amazon.com is 
higher for price decreases than for price increases, implying a low level of search cost for Amazon 
price information.  In addition, we find that price elasticity increases during the 4 weeks after price 
decreases, indicating that Amazon price information gradually penetrates the market over time. On the 
contrary, we find consumer price elasticity on Barnes & Noble.com is much lower for price decreases 
than for price increases, suggesting a high level of search cost for Barnes & Noble.com price 
information. Moreover, the result shows little information dissemination for the 4 weeks after price 
decreases. The contrast between Amazon and Barnes & Noble indicates that search costs are heavily 
influenced by online retailers. While we do not have data to reveal the underlying causes of the 
variations in search costs, one possible explanation is that the presence of search costs leads to 
consumers searching only on the websites of the largest online retailer (e.g. Amazon) but not on those 
of the comparatively smaller online retailers. This could lead to a dramatic difference in search costs 
between the top retailer and the remaining rivals. In this way, our results complement earlier studies 
that consider search costs as being mainly driven by consumer characteristics. We find that search 
costs vary significantly across online retailers even for those with similar competitive positions. This 
calls attention for the need for online retailers to pay more emphasis on search costs incurred by its 
potential customers and understand its strategic implications. 
 The Internet is known to facilitate the discovery of lesser known and obscure products. It has 
been argued that collectively these relatively less popular products could make up a significant portion 
of sales for online retailers(Anderson 2006). This Long Tail phenomenon makes it critically important 
that retailers provide active and passive tools to reduce search costs for less known products through 
both active and passive means (Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith 2006, Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee 2006).  
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Our analysis however shows that consumers in electronic markets incur higher search costs on 
unpopular books than on popular books. This suggests that online retailers are yet to fully recognize 
the importance the Long Tail phenomenon. Because of higher search costs, potential customers could 
have a difficult time locating price information for unpopular and rare books. This in turn can lead to 
fewer sales for such books and a significant reduction in inventory (Cachon, Terswiech and Xu 2006), 
thereby starting a vicious cycle that leads to fewer and fewer sales. Rather than focusing on promoting 
popular books which is what brick-mortar bookstores have been doing for years, online bookstores 
may be better off by reducing search costs for unpopular books to take advantage of the emerging 
Long Tail. In this context Amazon’s efforts to reduce prices for unpopular and rare books, compared 
to popular books seems like a step in the right direction. 
 One of our limitations is that we consider the nature of search costs only across online 
retailers. Our dataset prevents us from considering search costs across price comparison engines or 
shopping bots which make it possible for consumers to obtain a list of prices for a given product.  
Since a product search at any one of these sites will return a listing of prices that different merchants 
charge for the same product, one could argue that the marginal cost of obtaining a price quote is low at 
these sites.  However, since the choices consumer make in a shopbot eventually determines the 
demand for the enlisted retailer, our results have effectively incorporated the impact of shopbots on 
overall consumer demand. Another limitation of the paper is that while we show search costs vary 
significantly across online retailers, we do not have data to pinpoint the exact cause for the 
phenomenon. It could be due to consumers’ preferences for searching only the most well known and 
branded online retailer, which creates significant variations in the nature of the demand structure 
across online retailers. Or it could be due to the intrinsic differences in the type of consumers that the 
different online retailers attract. For example, Amazon may attract more tech-savvy consumers who 
are better at searching for lower prices, while Barnes & Noble’s clientele could be less tech-savvy with 
less experience in searching online for price information. It is also possible that the recommendation 
systems and co-purchase networks prevalent on Amazon reduce price search costs for consumers on 
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its website. Hann and Terweisch (2003) discuss how Amazon’s One-Click purchase system has 
reduced the overall cost of purchasing a product from its site compared to its rivals like Barnes & 
Noble. A deeper exploration of the causes for the variations in search costs across online retailers 
could be a fruitful area for future research.  
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Variable Observations Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
Amazon Sales Rank  559012 196715.2 319355.5 1 3628125 
List Price 557466 25.076 23.51 2.99 299 
Amazon Price 555207 19.414 22.092 2 299 
Minimum Used Price 532716 14.348 20.695 .01 2069.94 
Amazon Rating 433443 4.299 .722 1 5 
Amazon_Number_Reviews 433304 24.647 129.069 1 3229 
Number of Used  532728 49.66 31.057 1 614 
Amazon_Price Decrease 289810 .889 .313 0 1 
Amazon Price Change 569459 .025 .158 0 1 
Barnes & Noble Sales Rank  457836 99418.74 126015.2 1 724506 
Barnes & Noble Price 555852 23.346 22.399 2.99 299 
Barnes & Noble Rating 487289 1.665 2.206 0 5 
Barnes & 
Noble_Number_Reviews 
182047 11.386 54.571 1 1179 
Barnes & Noble_Price 
Decrease 
239830 .151 .358 0 1 
Barnes & Noble Price 
Change 
569459 .021 .144 0 1 
Days since Release 559012 196715.2 319355.5 1 3628125 
Table 1a: Summary Statistics 
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 Variable Obs. Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
Amazon Price     253380 21.956 26.990 2 299 Amazon Sales 
Rank >100000 Barnes & Noble 
Price 
254883 25.807 26.508 2.99 299 
Amazon Price     353576 20.808 25.026 2 299 Amazon Sales 
Rank > 40000 Barnes & Noble 
Price 
354901 24.840 24.800 2.99 299 
Amazon Price     420774 20.254 23.937 2 299 Amazon Sales 
Rank > 20000 Barnes & Noble 
Price 
421895 24.355 23.941 2.99 299 
Amazon Price     250301 22.065 25.445 2.38 299 BN Sales Rank 
>100000 Barnes & Noble 
Price 
247678 26.772 25.490 2.99 299 
Amazon Price     351499 21.320 24.767 2.38 299 BN Sales Rank 
> 40000 Barnes & Noble 
Price 
350137 26.096 24.881 2.99 299 
Amazon Price     412639 20.782 24.236 2.38 299 BN Sales Rank 
> 20000 Barnes & Noble 
Price 
411962 25.409 24.406 2.99 299 
Amazon Price     13406 16.264 9.253 2.99 162.4 Amazon Sales 
Rank (1-1000) Barnes & Noble 
Price 
11876 16.405 9.385 2.69 146.16 
Amazon Price     94455 15.167 12.202 2 162.4 Amazon Sales 
Rank (1-10000) Barnes & Noble 
Price 
95087 15.327 11.285 2.69 146.16 
Amazon Price     134431 16.787 14.601 2 299 Amazon Sales 
Rank (1-20000) Barnes & Noble 
Price 
115315 17.931 14.125 2.69 225 
Amazon Price     201625 16.969 15.370 2 299 Amazon Sales 
Rank (1- 40000) Barnes & Noble 
Price 
172080 18.414 14.929 2.69 269.1 
Amazon Price     10846 15.267 10.116 2.99 138.13 BN Sales Rank 
(1-1000) Barnes & Noble 
Price 
10882 14.563 9.498 2.69 139.27 
Amazon Price     94455 15.167 12.202 2 162.4 BN Sales Rank 
(1-10000) Barnes & Noble 
Price 
95087 15.327 11.285 2.69 146.16 
Amazon Price     142565 15.456 13.396 2 162.4 BN Sales Rank 
(1-20000) Barnes & Noble 
Price 
143829 15.693 12.260 2.69 161.77 
Amazon Price     203702 16.126 15.959 2 299 BN Sales Rank 
(1- 40000) Barnes & Noble 
Price 
205632 16.796 14.711 2.69 269.1 
Table 1b: Summary Statistics for Popular vs. Unpopular books 
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  Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Log(PAmazon) 1.71 *** 
(0.11) 
2.17*** 
(0.14) 
2.14*** 
(0.15) 
Log(PBN) 
 
-1.76 *** 
(0.10) 
-1.84*** 
(0.11) 
-1.82*** 
(0.11) 
∆Log(Amazon)*PriceDecreaseAmazon 0.37 *** 
(0.11) 
  
∆Log(PBN)*PriceDecreaseBN 0.74 *** 
(0.10) 
  
∆Log(PAmazon)*PriceDecreaseAmazon*
OneWeekAmazon 
 0.08 
(0.15) 
-0.07 
(0.15) 
∆Log(PAmazon)*PriceDecreaseAmazon*
TwoWeeksAmazon 
 0.28* 
(0.15) 
0.22 
(0.15) 
∆Log(PAmazon)*PriceDecreaseAmazon 
*ThreeWeeksAmazon 
 0.38** 
(0.15) 
0.33** 
(0.15) 
∆Log(PAmazon)*PriceDecreaseAmazon*
FourWeeksAmazon 
 0.40*** 
(0.12) 
0.40*** 
(0.15) 
∆Log(PBN)*PriceDecreaseBN* 
OneWeekBN 
 0.99*** 
(0.12) 
0.88*** 
(0.12) 
∆Log(PBN)*PriceDecreaseBN* 
TwoWeeksBN 
 0.88*** 
(0.15) 
0.85*** 
(0.15) 
∆Log(PBN)*PriceDecreaseBN* 
ThreeWeeksBN 
 0.89*** 
(0.17) 
0.86*** 
(0.17) 
∆Log(PBN)*PriceDecreaseBN* 
FourWeeksBN 
 0.95*** 
(0.14) 
0.90*** 
(0.15) 
Log(Number of Used) 0.08*** 
(0.01) 
 0.13*** 
(0.01) 
Log (Minm. Used Price) 0.04*** 
(0.01) 
 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
Log(Number of Reviews) 0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
Log(Rating) -0.27 
(0.09) 
-0.13 
(0.10) 
-0.13 
(0.11) 
No. of Observations 89045 62994 62282
R-square 69% 68% 69%
 
Table 2: Parameter estimates for search costs in the online book retailing industry.  The dependent 
variable is ln(sales rankAmazon)- ln(sales rankBN). Standard errors are listed in parenthesis; ***, **, * denote 
significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. All models use product-level fixed effects.
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Independent Variable Amazon 
Salesrank 
>20000 
Amazon 
Salesrank 
>40000 
Barnes & 
Noble 
Salesrank 
>20000 
Barnes & 
Noble 
Salesrank 
>40000 
Log(PAmazon) 2.64 *** 
(0.18) 
3.01*** 
(0.2) 
3.55*** 
(0.27) 
3.21*** 
(0.21) 
Log(PBN) 
 
-1.31 *** 
(0.13) 
-1.4 *** 
(0.14) 
-1.77 *** 
(0.18) 
-1.78 *** 
(0.17) 
∆Log(PAmazon)*PriceDecreaseAM
*OneWeekAmazon 
-0.23** 
(0.08) 
-0.26** 
(0.1) 
-0.5* 
(0.27) 
-0.48 ** 
(0.21) 
∆Log(PAmazon)*PriceDecreaseAM
*TwoWeeksAmazon 
-0.15 
(0.18) 
-0.07 
(0.2) 
-0.19 
(0.26) 
-0.35* 
(0.21) 
∆Log(PAmazon)*PriceDecreaseAM
*ThreeWeeksAmazon 
-0.1 
(0.18) 
0.03 
(0.2) 
0.04 
(0.25) 
-0.36* 
(0.2) 
∆Log(PAmazon)*PriceDecreaseAM
*FourWeeksAmazon 
-0.17 
(0.15) 
0.14 
(0.17) 
0.18 
(0.21) 
-0.3* 
(0.16) 
∆Log(PBN)*PriceDecreaseBN 
*OneWeekBN 
1.52*** 
(0.14) 
1.75*** 
(0.15) 
2.48*** 
(0.19) 
2.54*** 
(0.18) 
∆Log(PBN)*PriceDecreaseBN 
*TwoWeeksBN 
1.22*** 
(0.19) 
1.3*** 
(0.21) 
1.76*** 
(0.28) 
2.32*** 
(0.25) 
∆Log(PBN)*PriceDecreaseBN 
*ThreeWeeksBN 
1.16*** 
(0.21) 
1.2*** 
(0.24) 
1.43*** 
(0.31) 
2.21*** 
(0.29) 
∆Log(PBN)*PriceDecreaseBN 
*FourWeeksBN 
1.13*** 
(0.17) 
1.22*** 
(0.18) 
1.64*** 
(0.23) 
2.14*** 
(0.22) 
Log(Number of Used) 0.24*** 
(0.02) 
0.25*** 
(0.02) 
0.17*** 
(0.02) 
0.28*** 
(0.02) 
Log (Minm. Used Price) 0.11*** 
(0.016) 
0.12*** 
(0.016) 
0.1*** 
(0.02) 
0.1*** 
(0.02) 
Log(Number of Reviews) 0.16*** 
(0.05) 
0.21*** 
(0.06) 
0.52*** 
(0.08) 
0.24*** 
(0.06) 
Log(Rating) -0.33** 
(0.13) 
-0.4** 
(0.15) 
-0.47** 
(0.2) 
-0.43** 
(0.17) 
No. of Observations 
 
41404 34180 19539 27177 
R-square 62% 61% 56% 64% 
 
Table 3: Parameter estimates for books that are relatively unpopular. The dependent variable is ln(sales 
rankAmazon)- ln(sales rankBN). Standard errors are listed in parenthesis; ** and * denote significance at 
0.01 and 0.05, respectively. All models use product-level fixed effects.
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Independent Variable Amazon 
Salesrank < 
20000 
Amazon 
Salesrank < 
40000 
Barnes & 
Noble 
Salesrank < 
20000 
Barnes & 
Noble 
Salesrank < 
40000 
Log(PAmazon) 0.88 *** 
(0.25) 
1.6 *** 
(0.17) 
0.44** 
(0.23) 
1.37 *** 
(0.17) 
Log(PBN) 
 
-2.56 *** 
(0.22) 
-1.53 *** 
(0.15) 
-1.48 *** 
(0.15) 
-1.51 *** 
(0.13) 
∆Log(PAmazon)*PriceDecreaseAM
*OneWeekAmazon 
0.62*** 
(0.27) 
-0.01 
(0.18) 
1.12*** 
(0.25) 
0.38 ** 
(0.17) 
∆Log(PAmazon)*PriceDecreaseAM
*TwoWeeksAmazon 
1.29*** 
(0.29) 
0.29 
(0.19) 
1.55*** 
(0.25) 
0.76 ** 
(0.18) 
∆Log(PAmazon)*PriceDecreaseAM
*ThreeWeeksAmazon 
1.66*** 
(0.29) 
0.42 ** 
(0.19) 
1.846 
(0.29) 
0.92 ** 
(0.18) 
∆Log(PAmazon)*PriceDecreaseAM
*FourWeeksAmazon 
2.24 *** 
(0.23) 
0.52*** 
(0.16) 
1.98 *** 
(0.22) 
0.95*** 
(0.15) 
∆Log(PBN)*PriceDecreaseBN 
*OneWeekBN 
-0.46** 
(0.22) 
-0.1 
(0.15) 
-0.42** 
(0.16) 
0.25* 
(0.14) 
∆Log(PBN)*PriceDecreaseBN 
*TwoWeeksBN 
0.22 
(0.26) 
0.21 
(0.18) 
-0.25 
(0.18) 
0.39 ** 
(0.17) 
∆Log(PBN)*PriceDecreaseBN 
*ThreeWeeksBN 
0.3 
(0.28) 
0.31 
(0.2) 
-0.22 
(0.18) 
0.4 ** 
(0.19) 
∆Log(PBN)*PriceDecreaseBN 
*FourWeeksBN 
0.3 
(0.25) 
0.26 
(0.18) 
-0.14*** 
(0.05) 
0.24 
(0.16) 
Log(Number of Used) 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.1*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.1*** 
(0.01) 
Log (Minm. Used Price) -0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.03 *** 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.07 *** 
(0.01) 
Log(Number of Reviews) -0.26*** 
(0.06) 
-0.14*** 
(0.04) 
-0.14*** 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
Log(Rating) 0.012 
(0.16) 
-0.16 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
-0.24** 
(0.11) 
No. of Observations 
 
20877 42742 35104 50228 
R-square 79% 71% 71% 70% 
 
Table 4: Parameter estimates for books that are relatively popular. The dependent variable is ln(sales 
rankAmazon)- ln(sales rankBN).  Standard errors are listed in parenthesis; ** and * denote significance at 
0.01 and 0.05, respectively. All models use product-level fixed effects. 
                                                  35
 
Sales 
Rank at 
Amazon 
Variable Obs. Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
Amazon Change 13533 .021 .146 0 1 1-1000 
Barnes & Noble Change 13533 .115 .319 0 1 
Amazon Change 84804 .010 .103 0 1 1-10000 
Barnes & Noble Change 84804 .047 .213 0 1 
Amazon Change 134960 .009 .096 0 1 1-20000 
Barnes & Noble Change 134960 .038 .192 0 1 
Amazon Change 202566 .008 .090 0 1 1-40000 
Barnes & Noble Change 202566 .032 .177 0 1 
Amazon Change 303702 .007 .086 0 1 1-100000 
Barnes & Noble Change 303702 .027 .163 0 1 
 
Table 5: Table shows the descriptive statistics for frequency of price changes 
 
 
Sales 
Rank at 
Barnes 
& Noble 
Variable Obs. Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
Amazon Change 10882 .018 .134 0 1 1-1000 
Barnes & Noble Change 10882 .142 .349 0 1 
Amazon Change 95126 .009 .094 0 1 1-10000 
Barnes & Noble Change 95126 .044 .205 0 1 
Amazon Change 143887 .008 .090 0 1 1-20000 
Barnes & Noble Change 143887 .034 .181 0 1 
Amazon Change 205709 .007 .087 0 1 1-40000 
Barnes & Noble Change 205709 .038 .192 0 1 
Amazon Change 308174 .007 .084 0 1 1-100000 
Barnes & Noble Change 308174 .031 .175 0 1 
 
Table 6: Table shows the descriptive statistics for frequency of price changes 
 
 
 
